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The health care system in the United States is in chaos. The 
conflict is between containing costs on an aggregate level 
while, at the same time, not reducing services to the 
individual if the services are essential for quality care. 
There is little information on which to base decisions about 
the value of services. Health care organizations and deliv- 
ery models must be restructured because current models 
The health care delivery and financing system in the United 
States is undergoing profound change. The system is char- 
acterized by instability, turmoil, anger and multiple cracks 
and flaws. The theme of this discussion is that our organi- 
zational, financial and, especially, informational support 
systems are simply not adequate to cope with the rapid 
change that is occurring and with the conflicting goals that 
confront us as we attempt to achieve high quality and 
cost-conscious care. Three major forces are leading to a 
change in the system. 
Major forces leading to changes in health care delivery. 
TheJirst force is a public perception of the need to constrain 
the rate of increase in health care expenditures. Employers, 
labor, government, beneficiary groups and third parties all 
believe in the need to constrain the rate of increase in health 
care expenditures. However, they believe that aggregate 
expenditures need to be constrained. Many of these groups 
will not accept a reduction in services to individual patients 
to achieve cost-containment goals. 
A second major force consists of neM’ technologic capa- 
bilities that, together with changing social values and social 
beliefs, allow services to be furnished in a host of neu 
settings. These include ambulatory surgical centers, free- 
standing diagnostic centers, nuclear magnetic resonance 
imaging centers and free-standing cardiac catheterization 
centers. In addition, new technologies are available, includ- 
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are out of date. To accomplish this restructuring, better 
information is needed on why hospitals and doctors do what 
they do. Success in developing information and decision 
models that result in patients receiving only medically 
necessary services will contribute greatly to promoting high 
quality, cost-conscious care. 
(J Am Co11 Cardiol1989;14:3A_6A) 
ing infusion pumps and implantable defibrillators being used 
by patients miles from a hospital, catheterization during 
acute myocardial infarction, tissue plasminogen activator 
and balloon valvuloplasty. All of these technologies raise 
major issues of both cost and quality of care. Of particular 
concern to me is the quality of care furnished in alternative 
settings. This is a subject that has received very little 
attention. We focus much of our time and resources on the 
hospital, but the emergence of these new alternative settings 
raises a host of new quality of care concerns that receive 
little time and attention. 
The third force is the belief, at least (1 transient belief, 
that u more competitive medical market place will decrease 
costs and still allow us to have all the necessary individual 
services that we can consume. Therefore, we see the growth 
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred pro- 
vider organizations (PPOs), and independent practice asso- 
ciations (IPAs); we see providers merging with insurance 
companies until there is a blur between what is an insurance 
company and what is a provider. 
As the result of these three forces-the public perception 
that we should contain costs (without reducing services), 
new technologic capabilities and the belief in the medical 
market-we are left with extreme turmoil. Purchasers of 
services, including the government, traditional insurance 
companies, employers and organizations representing em- 
ployees, are using their purchasing power in a way they have 
never used it before. They are using the new technologic 
capabilities to stimulate competition and control costs. Also, 
as a result of these forces, the providers of service, including 
physicians, are increasingly competing with each other on 
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the basis of cost, technologic capability and quality of care. 
The purpose of the competition is to gain market share or, as 
the physicians would prefer to say, more patients, which is 
market share. 
Insurance strategy. The insurance strategy has been to 
develop policies to share risk. In insurance terms, insurance 
protects against risk. You have automobile, home and boat 
insurance. You also have insurance for protection against 
costly illness. Until 10 years ago, insurance companies, the 
government, the Blues (Blue Cross and Blue Shield) and the 
commercial insurers essentially behaved as conduits. They 
passed on the money from those who paid the premium to 
those (you) who provided the service. They were truly, in 
name and in function, third parties. Today, the insurance 
function has been fragmented. There is still the need to 
actuarially forecast the risk of illness, but this is quite 
straightforward. In fact, it is sufficiently well understood 
today that a major problem is the skimming of low risk 
individuals and fears of dumping of high risk individuals by 
both payers and providers. 
What is new in the insurance function today is the 
decision by third parties to use competition to share the risk, 
not the risk of illness, but the risk of treating the illness- 
which services are furnished, where they are provided and 
who furnishes them. Health maintenance organizations have 
used this approach for many years, but now all third parties 
are using it. Government, with Medicare’s prospective pay- 
ment system, pays a preset fee for a hospital stay and allows 
a provider to make a profit or a loss. It is sharing the risk of 
the treatment during a hospital course of illness. Preferred 
provider organizations that negotiate for contracts do the 
same thing. Medicaid with selective contracting policies is 
simply sharing the risk of treatment, not necessarily the risk 
of illness. 
Role of insurance companies in decision making. Medi- 
care, HMOs and CMPs as well as the Blues and the com- 
mercial insurers are all accomplishing this by developing 
managed care programs. How are they sharing risk, and why 
is this important to decision making? It is important because 
the information you generate is frequently targeted to a user 
group, and these individuals and organizations are very 
important user groups. 
First, the insurance companies use information to create 
jinancial incentives to share the risk of loss and allow an 
opporfunity for projit. The Medicare diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs), Medicare capitated programs and other 
managed care initiatives use information to create financial 
incentives. Prices may be set by the payer as they are with 
Medicare, prospective payment system (PPS) or businesses 
may be asked to offer prices for the right to get market share. 
Providers are then faced with the need to compete with each 
other for the price that is set or the price they bid in order to 
survive and hold an adequate market share. 
The second major way that groups are using information 
is by examination of the use of services. Both traditional 
insurance companies and the new nontraditional managed 
care entities are engaging in far more active oversight as to 
how services are furnished, leaving you with a very clear 
target group for new information. The tools that these groups 
are using are preadmission review and certification. Who 
gets into the hospital and who does not? Who gets the 
service and who does not? Concurrent review of medical 
records, retrospective review and second opinion programs 
are in place. By and large, however, all of these tools 
continue to be directed only to the hospital. They are not 
directed to the physician, and very frequently are not 
directed to the new alternative sites of care delivery. As a 
result, there is a wide gap where services can be shifted out 
of a hospital with virtually no oversight as to quality care and 
utilization. 
Cost-containment measures and increased competition 
have not reduced costs. How have DRGs, HMOs, PPOs 
fared in the move toward cost-containment and more com- 
petition? First, we have redistributed dollars. Lengths of 
stay and admission rates to the hospital for patients insured 
by Medicare and for all third parties have decreased dramat- 
ically. The fraction of our dollars going to inpatient hospital 
services has dropped, and the fraction going to outpatient 
hospital services has increased, as has the fraction going to 
other outpatient services and physicians. 
Second, and this may come as a surprise to some of you, 
we have not altered the historic rate of increase in expendi- 
tures for health services in this country. Despite all the 
hand-wringing, all the press and all the editorials, we have 
not altered the rate of increase in health care expenditures. 
Total health care expenditures in this country in 1986 were 
$458 billion, 10.9% of the gross national product and an 
increase of 8.4% from 1985. Those are total health care 
dollars. Let us look only at the direct provision of goods and 
services to beneficiaries. In 1986, the direct provision of 
goods and services was $404 billion in this country, an 
increase of 8.8% from 1985. Cost containment from 1985 to 
1986 was an 8.8% increase. Now take that 8.8% and frag- 
ment it; it falls into three categories. The first category is 
price inflation. General medical prices increased from 1985 
to 1986 by 7.5%. The rate of inflation in our general economy 
in that same time frame was only 1.9%. You may argue that 
1.9% is distorted because of the significant decrease in oil 
prices. Prices went up 3.9% in the general economy, not 
7.5%. You say that still is not right because the general 
economy represents manufacturing as well as services. In 
fact, the service sector economy of 1985 to 1986 went up 5%. 
Medical price inflation still went up 7.5%, which is 54% of 
the overall growth. We have more people, more older 
people, more people getting more services to account for. Of 
the 8.8% increase, only 11% was accounted for by popula- 
tion growth and aging. Fifty-four percent is due to inflation; 
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35% of the increase was for changes in consumption and 
intensity of consumption. 
We continue to provide more services to the same people, 
and more services to new people, so our cost-containment 
initiative is essentially a national myth. Our rate of increase 
is almost at the same level that it has been for the past IO 
years when you deflate for price. It is projected with the 
current policies that by the year 2000, some 11 years from 
now, we will be spending $1.5 trillion on health care, 15% of 
our gross national product. 
Problems with cost containment. Why, then, with the 
belief in cost containment and all the pressure and hand- 
wringing are we so concerned about a decrease in quality of 
care? Do we really know if quality of care has altered? If 
quality of care is altered, it certainly cannot be because we 
have altered the total number of dollars that have been put 
into the system. We have altered the distribution of dollars. 
Is the perception regarding changes in quality of care merely 
that? A perception. We simply do not know. 
Let me give you some thoughts as to why we have not 
been able to do any better than we have in cost containment. 
First, we do not know how, to reduce costs without reducing 
services, and we do not want to reduce services for fear that 
quality of care will diminish. Our information base and 
decision-making skills are sufficiently poor that in the ab- 
sence of clear evidence that a procedure is not valuable, we 
will proceed with it and pay for it. In the absence of 
assurances that the quality of care and access to care will not 
decrease, we as a society will not take the chance. In other 
words, our default position in the face of uncertainty is to 
provide the service and increase the cost, and we are a 
nation faced with immense uncertainty about medicine. 
Policy deals with populations of people: it deals with 
aggregates. Medical care deals with individuals and individ- 
ual needs. We can set cost-containment policies, we can 
decrease DRG payments, we can set lower capitated 
amounts, we can build incentives that work. The Medicare 
PPS incentives regarding hospital admissions and the lengths 
of stay do work, and could work better if we wish to stay 
with them. However, attempts to do so on the aggregate are 
met with claims that individuals will suffer, and we as a 
nation (our political system and our basic morals and beliefs) 
focus on the needs of the individual. Our default position, 
therefore, is to provide more service when in doubt. Policy 
can develop incentives that work, but policy cannot make 
the medical necessity decisions for the individual patient. 
These reside with the doctor, the patient, the hospital, the 
nurse and the other providers. 
Let me cite the example of hip fracture care and treat- 
ment under the Medicare PROS together with PPS (1). I cite 
this example because a number of individuals in Indiana 
were responsible for that study and its publication. Are the 
findings of that study an indictment of the failure of PPS? Or 
were the findings an indictment of the failure of clinical 
decision making? Or are they a broader failure of our 
medical care system? With fee for service payment, cost- 
based reimbursement and charge-based reimbursement, 
overutilization is the potential problem. With capitation and 
managed care. and PPOs, IPAs and Medicare DRGs, under- 
utilization is the potential problem. In fact, the evidence to 
date shows very little difference in total expenditures be- 
tween the two different payment mechanisms as they are 
currently structured. 
The key conclusions for this Symposium that I draw from 
the preceding statements is that we cannot define or measure 
either over- or underutilization. We do not know why 
doctors and hospitals do what they do. We can describe the 
variations in medical practice, but are unable to make the 
normative decisions as to which variation is too little or too 
much. This is because, first, we cannot clearly define, let 
alone measure, quality of care. We have focused attention 
on the hospital, where we believe our support systems, our 
conditions of participation, our standards and our licensure 
laws will provide us with a minimal level of quality. We have 
not looked at the issue of quality of care in alternative 
settings and, as physicians, we have actively fought any 
attempts to do such a thing in a physician’s office. Rarely 
have we examined the episode of illness and the outcome. 
Second, we have not related the quality of a service to its 
value to the patient in either economic or noneconomic 
terms. Is a marginally positive improvement worth any 
price? What is unnecessary, and how do you define and 
measure it? In the area of cardiology, we have coronary 
artery bypass grafting, percutaneous coronary angioplasty, 
catheterization during the acute myocardial infarction, tissue 
plasminogen activator and a host of other technologies about 
which we have virtually no long-term outcome data, no 
value data, despite immense amounts of research. 
Third, we have focused on a medical model and medical 
needs; we pay little attention to social needs. Again in the 
area of the hip fracture and the care of patients since the 
beginning of Medicare prospective payment policy, the 
group at Indiana University Medical Center showed that 
patients left the hospital “quicker and sicker.” The number 
of rehabilitation services furnished decreased from pre-PPS 
levels, and once patients entered a nursing home, they 
stayed there. The key variable in those patients was absence 
of home support. The researchers could not identify any 
significant differences in the medical condition of the patient. 
They identified a significant difference in the social needs. 
The medical model that has guided us with its traditional, 
organizational and payment arrangements has not regarded 
home support as a key variable. 
Fourth, we have a payment system and structure that are 
out of date. Medicare has a Part A and Part B. Blue Cross 
has Blue Cross and Blue Shield divisions, which, in some 
cases, are now merging. Our health care system is no longer 
divided into Parts A and B. It is no longer divided into 
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hospitals and doctors’ offices. In the alternative care arena, 
we have few tools for measuring quality of care and out- 
come. In other words, we have immense gaps in our data and 
knowledge base. Where we do have information, it is fre- 
quently either not used or misused. The Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield Association together with the American College of 
Physicians generated a list of procedures that may be and 
frequently are unnecessary for the care of the patient. I have 
heard two things that are happening with that list. On the one 
hand, a few third parties want to translate that list directly to 
payment policy that was not intended or appropriate. On the 
other hand, physicians looked at the list, said that it was very 
interesting and proceeded to do exactly what they would 
have done before that list and the expert opinion attached to 
it. We simply do not use information or we misuse much of 
it when we do have it. I have cited coronary artery bypass 
surgery a number of times. Despite hundreds of millions of 
dollars spent in clinical trials and research for that proce- 
dure, information is still needed. How much information do 
we need to have and how can that information be used? 
There are flaws in the information base and in the decision 
making. The information is frequently inadequate for policy 
by third parties. I can structure financial incentives for 
populations in the aggregate. I can deal with the issues of the 
complex new cardiac pacemakers. In fact, however, these 
policies may not be implementable because they are not 
acceptable by clinicians who deal with individual patients 
and the clinicians complain through their professional orga- 
nizations to the decision makers in Washington, D.C. 
In summary, I have left for you what I believe is an 
extremely pessimistic, but challenging, outlook on how one 
can and should use medical information. Our health care 
system continues to be in chaos and continues to undergo 
dramatic changes that will continue for the foreseeable 
future. The interest in containing cost on an aggregate level 
remains, but we are not willing to reduce services in the 
absence of information to assure us that quality care will not 
be harmed. New technologies and capabilities are, in fact, 
allowing us to expand services both in and out of the 
hospital. We frequently have little information documenting 
the value of these new services to the many patients who 
receive them. In the face of uncertainty, the needs of the 
individual hold sway, and we will continue to err on the side 
of more rather than less. Our resources are finite, however, 
and the more we spend on the acute medical care model, the 
less will be available for other socially worthy needs such as 
housing, nutrition and long-term care and support. 
My agenda includes four items for your consideration. 
First, we must totally restructure our delivery and payment 
models. Our current models are out of date. Second, we 
must better use the information we have available, better 
define the users and the targets of that information, better 
target messages to specific defined users and continue to 
develop more information related to quality of care for an 
entire episode of illness. Third, we must blend social needs 
with our traditional medical needs model in our information 
base and decision models. Fourth, we must learn much more 
about patient value systems, examine the utility of services 
to individual patients and build all of this into our model. If 
you are successful in developing information and decision 
models that result in patients receiving only medically nec- 
essary services, you will also be successful in promoting 
high quality care that is cost-conscious care. If you do this, 
you will make my job easier. I will, therefore, follow your 
progress and cheer you on. 
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